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S E C R E T TAIPEI 229

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SUBJ: COUNTRY TEAM ASSESSMENT OF GRC INTENTIONS

7/31/67

REF: STATE 35828 (LD) (POL CHICOM-CHINAT); TAIPEI 3662 (LD) - POL 27 Chicom - Chinat

1. THIS MESSAGE DISCUSSES THE PROBLEM OF THE GRC'S MARITIME INCURSIONS, AND INDICATES BRIEFLY WHAT THEY ARE AND WHAT THEY ARE NOT.

2. THE INCURSIONS ARE SMALL-SCALE. WE KNOW OF NO GRC PLANS TO MOUNT ANY LARGE-SCALE MILITARY OR PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS NOW OR IN THE NEAR FUTURE; SUCH OPERATIONS ARE UNLIKELY AND BEYOND GRC CAPABILITIES.

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THE LAST INCURSION OF ANY SIZE WAS THE DISASTROUS ONE OF AUGUST 1965 IN WHICH THE GRC LOST TWO SHIPS NEAR TUNGSHAN ISLAND. SINCE THAT TIME THERE HAVE BEEN SEVEN KNOWN INCURSIONS -- IN RUBBER RAFTS, M-5 CLASS FIBERGLASS SPEEDBOATS, AND AN OUTBOARD-POWERED CATAMARAN. THESE HAVE GENERALLY COMPRISED 6-10 PEOPLE,

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THE LARGEST BEING A TEAM OF ABOUT 15 MEN IN TWO SPEEDBOATS USED IN THE SHUNTUNG RAID ON 29 MAY 1967.

3. GRC INTENTIONS ARE SMALL-SCALE. THESE RELATE TO MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, SMALL-SCALE SABOTAGE, OCCASIONAL INTERDICTION OF FISHING BOATS, INFILTRATION OF AGENTS INTO MAINLAND CHINA, ANT LEAST, PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT.

4. VARIOUS GRC ENTITIES CONDUCT INCURSIONS, INCLUDING UNITS FROM THE CHINESE NAVY, CHINESE ARMY, THE INTELLIGENCE BUREAU OF THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSEN AND IRREGULAR FORCES FROM THE ANTI-COMMUNIST NATIONAL SALVATION ARMY, (AN AGING GROUP OF SOME 5,000 IRREGULARSN PRIMARILY STATIONED ON TUNG YIN ISLAND). THE PARTICULAR UNITS USED DO NOT USE MAP EQUIPMENT IN RAIDS AND ARE NOT MAAG-SUPPORTED. THERE IS HOWEVER, SOME OCCASIONAL

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U.S. SUPPORT TO CERTAIN GRC INTELLIGENCE COLLECTING EFFORTS.

5. THERE IS NO EFFECTIVE CENTRAL GRC DIRECTION AND COORDINATION OF THESE INCURSIONS. THESE INCURSIONS ARE OFTEN RUN WITHOUT THE COORDINATIO
OR FOREKNOWLEDGE OF
OTHER GRC OFFICES. THERE HAVE EVEN BEEN CASES WHERE DEFENSE MINISTER CHIANG CHINJ-KUO HAS BEEN UNAWARE OF THE ACTUAL OPERATION BEFORE THE FACT. WE KNOW THAT HIS PRESENT POSITION REMAINS SOMEWHAT AMBIVALENT BETWEEN THE TRADITIONAL GRC INTEREST IN "BACK TO THE MAINLAND," AND THE RECE
T GENERAL GRC EMPHASIS ON POLITICAL ACTIONS.
RECENTLY, THE GRC HAS BEEN ATTEMPTING TO MAKE NSB AND J/E MND RESPONSIBLE FOR COORDINATING SMALL-SCALE MARITIME OPERATIONS BUT IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER THIS COORDINATION WILL BE EFFECTIVE. IN ANY CASE, IN THE MAIN THE INCURSIONS REMIAN POORLY COORDINATED AND POORLY EXECUTED.

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6. WE KNOW THAT THERE IS A SLIGHTLY HEIGHTENED HIGH-LEVEL GRC MILITARY INTEREST OF LATE I CONTINUING VARIOUS INCURSION ATTEMPTS, AND WE MUST ASSUME THAT

THEY WILL SO CONTINUE. WE ESTIMATE THAT THEY WILL CONTINUE TO USE THE AVAILABLE TYPES OF BOATS IN INCURSION ATTEMPTS. IN ADDITION, THE GRC WILL HAVE TOW MIDGET SUBMARINES, EACH CAPABLE OF LANDING UP TO SIX PEOPLE, IN OPERATION AT SOME FUTURE TIME AND WILL PROBABLY COMMIT THEM OCCASIONALLY TO SUCH ACTIVITIES.

7. ALTHOUGH GRC MARITIME INCURSIONS OVE THE YEARS HAVE FOR THE MOST PART BEEN UNSUCCESSUFL, GRC LEADERSHIP VIES THEM AS PSYCHOLOGICALLY NECESSARY BOTH FOR MORALE AND PROPAGANDA PURPOSES WITHIN TAIWAN, AND TO GIVE HOPE TO REAMAINING GRC ADHERENTS ON THE MAINLAND.

8. GRC NEWS TREATMENT OF THESE INCURSIONS IS FOR THE MOST PART MISLEADING, IN THAT PUBLIC GRC ACCOUNTS PICTURE THE OPEARTIONS AS BEING LARGE AND MORE SUCCESSFUL THAN THEY ARE IN FACT.

9. APPROPRIATE U.S. AUTHORITY HAS HAD FOREKNOWLEDGE, BUT NOT CONTROL, OF CERTAIN OF THESE INCURSIONS; THE GRC, NEVERTHELESS, HAS THE CAPABILITY TO LAUNCH SUCH INCURSIONS WITHOUT PRIOR U.S. KNOWLEDGE. OUR KNOWLEDGE

AFTER THE FACT IS GENERALLY QUITE GOOD, FROM SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE SOURCES IN PARTICULAR.

10. SUCH INCURSIONS ARE IN PART UNDERSTANDABLE NOT IN EMPIRICAL RESULT, BUT BECAUSE THEY ARE ONE OF THE FEW AVENUES OF INDEPENDENT CAPABILITY ACUTALLY OPEN

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TO GHE GRC, A GRC DEDICATE TO THE RETURN TO THE MAINLAND WHICH TRIES TO PROVE TO ITSELF AND TO ITS SUBJECTS THAT ITS GOAL CAN BE ACHEVED. THIS SITUATION EXISTS NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE TOP GRC MILITARY KNOWS FULL WELL THAT THE MILITARY BALANCE IS CONSTANTLY SHIFTING, TO THE DISADVANTAGE OF GRC, WITH REFERENCE NOT ONLY TO ADVANCED WEAPONS, BUT TO THE RESPECTIMI CHICOM AND CHINAT CONVENTIONAL MILITARY POTENTIALS IN TAIWAN STRAIT AREA. MCCONAUGHY

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